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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JANE DOE, : 
Petitioner-Respondent, : 
-v - : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC s 
SAFETY; PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS 
AND TRAINING; TED E. LEAMONS, : 
DIRECTOR; WILLIAM L. FLINK; 
and John Does I through IV, : 
Respondents-Appellants. : 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is the 
following: 
1. Did the district court erroneously rule that Peace 
Officer Standards and Training ("P.O.S.T."), a division of the 
Department of Public Safety, may not consider convictions 
expunged under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-2 (1982) in deciding 
whether to grant or deny peace officer certification to an 
individual under UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-15-10.5 (Supp. 19 85)? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the district court's order granting 
Jane Doe's motion for summary judgment and denying P.O.S.T.fs 
motion for summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action 
filed by Jane Doe (R. 2-10). In that order and the accompanying 
memorandum decision (Appendix A) f the lower court ruled that, 
under S 67-15-10.5 and S 77-18-2, P.O.S.T. may not consider 
expunged convictions in deciding whether to grant or deny peace 
officer certification to an individual (R. 186-95). 
Case No. 860138 
Category No. 13b 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essential facts of this case are not in dispute. 
Jane Doe, a resident of Salt Lake County, is an employee of Adult 
Probation and Parole, a subdivision of the Department of 
Corrections. In November 1984, she obtained expungements under 
S 77-18-2 of a felony conviction for obtaining money under false 
pretenses and a class A misdemeanor conviction for possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value 
(Appendix B). Upon application to P.O.S.T. for correctional 
officer certification, which is required for her position with 
Adult Probation and Parole, JSJ££ UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-la-2 (Supp. 
1985) , and completion of the necessary training for that level of 
certification, Ms. Doe was informed that a committee of the 
P.O.S.T. Council* would meet to determine whether there was 
probable cause based upon her expunged convictions to issue an 
administrative complaint that sought denial of certification. 
Findings of Fact at 2-3 (R. 189-90). 
Prior to the hearing before the P.O.S.T. Council 
committee, Ms. Doe filed a petition for declaratory judgment 
which asked the district court to declare that, under the 
pertinent statutes, P.O.S.T. was prohibited from considering her 
expunged convictions (R. 2-10). She also obtained a temporary 
restraining order from the court which prohibited P.O.S.T. from 
1 The P.O.S.T. Council was created by statute "to serve as an 
advisory board to the director of the division of peace officer 
training on matters relating to peace officer standards and 
training." § 67-15-11. It is statutorily autorized to advise 
the director on certification of individual peace officers. 
S 67-15-17(2). 
-2-
proceeding with that hearing (R. 34-35)• Pursuant t o s t i p u l a t i o n 
of the p a r t i e s , the court then issued a preliminary injunction 
which enjoined P.O.S.T. from holding a probable cause hearing 
unt i l the i s s u e s regarding considerat ion of expunged convict ions 
were resolved (R. 2 6 - 2 7 ) . After the part i e s had f i l e d c r o s s -
motions for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment act ion 
and the court had heard oral argument on February 7, 1986, the 
court granted Ms. Doe's motion and ruled that , under § 67-15-1 e t 
seq. and § 77-18-2 , P.O.S.T. may not consider Ms. Doe's expunged 
convict ions "for purposes of determining cause for refusal to 
i ssue p e t i t i o n e r ' s P.O.S.T. c e r t i f i c a t i o n " (R. 186-87, 192) . I t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y held that Mt ]he l ega l e f f e c t of an expungement i s 
t o render any related convic t ion , arrest or record thereof a 
l e g a l n u l l i t y , i . e . , as a matter of law the convic t ion , arrest or 
record never existed" (R. 192 ) . P.O.S.T. appeals to t h i s Court 
from the d i s t r i c t cour t ' s order and memorandum dec i s ion granting 
Ms. Doe's motion for summary judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A fair reading of the plain language of § 77-18-2 and § 
67-15-10.5, coupled with a recognition of the clear purpose of 
the peace officer standards and training statutes, indicates that 
the Legislature did not intend to restrict P.O.S.T.'s 
consideration of disqualifying criminal convictions for purposes 
of peace officer certification to those convictions that have not 
been expunged. Therefore, the district court incorrectly ruled 
that P.O.S.T. may not consider Ms. Doe's expunged convictions in 
deciding whether to issue her correctional officer certification. 
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Accordingly, t h i s Court should reverse the lower cour t ' s order 
granting Ms. Doe's motion for summary judgment and hold that 
P.O.S.T. may properly consider the expunged conv ic t i ons . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
P.O.S.T AND THE P.O.S .T . COUNCIL MAY CONSIDER 
CONVICTIONS EXPUNGED UNDER § 7 7 - 1 8 - 2 IN 
DECIDING WHETHER TO GRANT OR DENY 
CERTIFICATION UNDER § 6 7 - 1 5 - 1 0 . 5 . 
Summary judgment should be granted when there i s no 
genuine i s sue as t o any material fact and the moving party i s 
e n t i t l e d t o judgment as a matter of law. Snyder v. Merkley, 693 
P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984) . The par t i e s here do not disagree as t o 
any of the material f a c t s . The only i s sue i s whether P.O.S.T. 
and the P.O.S.T. Council may consider convic t ions expunged under 
§ 77-18-22 in deciding whether to grant or deny c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
under § 67 -15 -10 .5 . The d i s t r i c t court resolved that i s sue 
against P.O.S.T. under UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-33-1 and -2 (1977), 
Utah's declaratory judgment s t a t u t e s , by granting Ms. Doe's 
motion for summary judgment. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-15-1 (Supp. 1985) s e t s forth the 
purpose behind the creat ion of P.O.S.T.: 
To better promote and insure the safety 
and welfare of the c i t i z e n s of t h i s s t a t e in 
the ir respect ive communities and to provide 
for more e f f i c i e n t and profess ional law 
enforcement by e s t a b l i s h i n g minimum standards 
and training for peace o f f i c e r s throughout 
the s t a t e , there i s hereby created a d i v i s i o n 
2 Under Utah's expungement s t a t u t e , convict ion records are 
ac tua l l y "sealed." £££ §§ 77-18-2(1) (b) and - 2 ( 4 ) . A copy of 
S 77-18-2 i s contained in Appendix C. 
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of the state department of public safety to 
be known as the division of peace officer 
standards and training which shall be 
administered by a director appointed by and 
acting under the supervison and control of 
the commissioner of public safety. 
By enacting this purpose clause, the Legislature sought to insure 
that only those persons who meet certain minimum standards would 
be eligible to become peace officers. An obvious concern was 
that the prospective peace officer had not been found guilty of 
certain types of criminal offenses. jj££ §§ 67-15-6(4) and 
-10.5(1)(d). 
Section 67-15-10.5(1) (d) , the in terpre ta t ion of which 
i s of primary concern in the instant case ,3 provides: 
(1) The director may, upon the 
concurrence of the majority of the counci l , 
and af ter the person or peace o f f i cer 
involved has been afforded prior not ice and 
an opportunity for a f u l l hearing before the 
counci l , revoke, refuse , or suspend 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n of a person as a peace o f f i cer 
for cause. Any of the fol lowing shal l 
c o n s t i t u t e cause for such act ion: 
. . . 
(d) Conviction of a felony or any crime 
involving dishonesty, unlawful sexual 
conduct, or physical v i o l e n c e ! . ] 
3 Criminal convic t ions for of fenses not i d e n t i f i e d in subsection 
(d) may be relevant t o revocation, suspension, or denial of 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n under subsect ion ( e ) , which i d e n t i f i e s as cause for 
such ac t i on : 
Any conduct or pattern of conduct that 
would tend to d isrupt , diminish or otherwise 
jeopardize public t rus t and f i d e l i t y with 
regard t o law enforcement. 
Thus, the ana lys i s in t h i s brief that pertains to subsection (d) 
i s appl icable to subsect ion (e) insofar as expunged convict ions 
may be considered under subsect ion ( e ) . 
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There i s nothing in subsection (1) (d) t ha t even suggests tha t the 
Legis la ture intended t o r e s t r i c t P.O.S.T. fs consideration of 
convictions of disqualifying offenses to those convictions tha t 
had not been expunged. In fac t , the use of the unmodified term 
•conviction" ind ica tes tha t the opposite was intended. ij££ 
Granite School D i s t r i c t v. Sal t Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 
(Utah 1983) ("terms of a s t a t u t e are used advisedly and should be 
given an i n t e rp re t a t i on and appl ica t ion which i s in accord with 
the i r usually accepted meanings"). To read (1) (d) otherwise 
would defeat the clear purpose of the peace officer standards and 
t ra in ing laws. S&e Mi l le t t v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934f 
936 (Utah 1980) ("This Court ' s primary respons ib i l i ty in 
construing l e g i s l a t i v e enactments i s to give effect t o the 
l e g i s l a t u r e ' s underlying i n t e n t . " ) . An expungement does not 
a l t e r the h i s t o r i c a l fact of a conviction, which r e f l e c t s gu i l t 
of ce r t a in criminal behavior the Legis la ture has determined 
should be grounds for denying an individual peace officer s t a t u s . 
What was obviously important to the Legis la ture was the presence 
or fact of the conviction—which r e l a t e s d i r ec t ly to an 
i nd iv idua l ' s f i t ne s s t o be a peace of f icer . 
Furthermore, Utah's current expungement s t a t u t e , § 77-
18-2, does not prohibi t considerat ion of an expunged conviction 
by a governmental l icensing agency l ike P.O.S.T. This conclusion 
becomes apparent a f te r a review of the s igni f icant changes the 
Legis la ture made in the expungement law when i t adopted the 
current s t a t u t e . 
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Under UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-17.5 (1953) (Appendix D), 
Utah's former expungement statute, any person who had been 
convicted of a crime in this state could petition the convicting 
court for a judicial pardon and for the expungement of his record 
in that court. If the court found that the petitioner had 
satisfied the requirements for a judicial pardon and expungement 
of his record contained in § 77-35-17.5(1)(b), the court entered 
"an order that all records in the petitioner's case in the 
custody of that court or in the custody of any other court, 
agency or official, be sealed." Section 77-35-17.5(1)(c) further 
provided: "Upon the entry of the order in those proceedings, the 
petitioner shall be deemed judicially pardoned and the petitioner 
may thereafter respond to any inquiries relating to convictions 
of crimes as though that conviction never occurred." Under the 
broad language used in this former statute, a person who obtained 
a judicial pardon and an expungement of a conviction pursuant to 
it could lawfully respond to any inquiry relating to convictions 
as if the expunged conviction had never occurred. A single Utah 
case, State v. Jonesf 581 P.2d 141 (Utah 1978), which construed 
the former statute and held that a felon whose conviction had 
been expunged could not be impeached as a witness on account of 
his prior conviction, suggests that the statute provided a full 
and complete expungement, legally erasing the prior conviction. 
Thompson v. Department of the Treasury, 557 F.Supp. 158, 167 (D. 
Utah 1982). 
In 1980, the Legislature enacted the current 
expungement statute, § 77-18-2. Although similar to the former 
-7-
law in many respects , S 77-18-2 contains several important 
changes. A particularly significant change is found in 
subsection (3) of the current law which replaces the former 
provision allowing the petitioner to respond to any inquiry 
relating to prior convictions as though the expunged conviction 
had never occurred (see former § 77-35-17.5(1)(c)). Subsection 
(3) reads: 
Employers may inquire concerning arrests 
or convictions only to the extent that the 
arrests have not been expunged or the record 
of convictions sealed under this provision. 
In the event an employer asks concerning 
arrests which have been expunged or 
convictions the records of which have been 
sealed, the person who has received 
expungement of arrest or judicial pardon may 
answer as though the arrest or conviction had 
not occurred. [Emphasis added.] 
Also eliminated in the current statute is the language stating 
that "the petitioner shall be deemed judicially pardoned." As 
noted in Thompson v. Department of the Treasuryr which discussed 
these changes and held that expungement of several convictions 
under S 77-18-2 did not relieve the petitioner of a federal 
firearms disability: 
There is no explanation in the 
legislative history for the changes in the 
amended statute, nor have there been any 
cases construing the new statute. The new 
language, especially when construed in light 
of the former language, seems to place a 
limitation on the effect of the judicial 
pardon and expungement. Though the 
legislative intent is not entirely clear, the 
court must conclude that the statute was 
changed for a purpose; and that purpose, from 
the substance of the change, evidently was to 
limit the effect of a judicial pardon and 
expungement. 
-8-
557 F.Supp. at 167. Thus, an expungement under S 77-18-2 is not 
as complete as one under the former law and only gives the 
convicted person the right to deny to "employers" the existence 
of the expunged conviction. No longer can he or she deny its 
existence in response to "any inquiries."* 
Under this analysis of the changes, P.O.S.T., which 
cannot reasonably be regarded as an "employer" and is most 
appropriately viewed as a licensing agency, may properly require 
disclosure of convictions expunged under the current law and 
consider those convictions in the certification process. £££ 
Dixon v. McMullen. 527 F.Supp. 711 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (upholding 
denial of police officer certification to an ex-felon although he 
had received a pardon); Patt v. Nevada State Board of 
Accountancy. 93 Nev. 548, 571 P.2d 105 (1977) (upholding 
revocation of certified public accountant's certificate based 
upon embezzlement conviction which had effectively been expunged 
under Nevada law providing for honorable discharge from 
probation); Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners. 34 Cal.2d 62, 
206 P.2d 1085 (1949) (holding that expunged conviction could 
provide basis for revocation of medical license); Amber son v-
Leamons, Third Dist. Ct. No. C85-6240 (November 25, 1985) (ruling 
4
 Although paragraph III of the expungement orders on 
petitioner's convictions states: "That upon entry of this order, 
the petitioner shall be deemed judicially pardoned and he may 
thereafter respond to any inquiries relating to convictions of 
crimes as though the conviction above described had never 
occurred" (Appendix B), that statement simply is not an accurate 
statement of the current law and is therefore not controlling. 
£&£ State v. Chambersf 533 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) (expungement of 
criminal records is controlled by statute). 
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that P.O.S.T. could properly deny certification to individual 
whose felony conviction had been expunged under Colorado's 
deferred sentencing law) (Appendix E). ££. Manners v. State, Bd, 
Of Veterinary Medicine, 694 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Idaho 1985) (which 
takes a view contrary to £a£± and U^SLL) • This conclusion is 
consistent with the generally accepted notion that expungement is 
a criminal remedy, while licensing is civil in nature, £££ 
Copeland v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 241 Cal. 
App. 2d 186, 50 Cal. Rptr. 452 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966), and that in 
view of the "high degree of professional skill and fidelity to 
the public [licensed occupations] served," licensing boards must 
be allowed considerable discretion in deciding whether a former 
criminal has rehabilitated sufficiently to assume such 
responsibilities. Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 
182, 186 (1959). By enacting the peace officer standards and 
training statutes, the Legislature codified the generally 
accepted view that a high standard of fitness and character 
pertains to police officers. j£e£, e.g.
 f HixQnir 527 F.Supp. at 
721; Faure v. Chesworth, 489 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643 (1985); Amberson 
v. Learnons. A person lacking the necessary qualifications simply 
has no constitutional right to public employment as a police 
officer. Monroe v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, 524 
F.Supp. 1009, 1013 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Hardy v. Stumpf. 145 Cal. 
Rptr. 176, 179, 576 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1978). 
Particularly applicable to the instant case is the 
reasoning applied by the United States Supreme Court in Dickerson 
v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (1982). There, the 
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Court addressed the issue of "whether firearms disabilities 
imposed by 18 U.S.C. §S 922(g) and (h) (federal gun control laws] 
apply with respect to a person who pleads guilty to a state 
offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one yearf when 
the record of the proceeding subsequently is expunged under state 
procedure following a successfully served term of probation." 
JLd. at 105. It held that because "Congress used unambiguous 
language in attaching gun control disabilities to any person 'who 
has been convicted1 of a [dis]qualifying offense," id. at 122, 
the government could properly deny a firearms license to a person 
who had been charged under Iowa law with a crime of the 
disqualifying type, had pleaded guilty to that charge, and had 
been placed on probation, even though that person's conviction 
subsequently was expunged under Iowa's deferred sentencing 
statute. In reaching this conclusion, the Court made several 
observations that are central to the analysis that should be 
applied in construing §§ 67-15-10.5(1)(d) and (e) and § 77-18-2. 
First, there was nothing in the plain language of the 
statute or its legislative history "that suggests, even remotely, 
that a state expunction was intended automatically to remove the 
disabilities imposed by tthe federal gun control laws]." Xd. at 
119. "[Tlhe purpose of the statute would be frustrated by a 
ruling that gave effect to state expunctions; a state expunction 
typically does not focus upon the question with which Title IV is 
concerned, namely, whether the convicted person is fit to engage 
in the firearms business or to possess a firearm." Ibid. 
Similarly, an expungement under § 77-18-2 does not focus on the 
question of whether one is fit to be a peace officer in Utah. 
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Second, Iowa's expunction provis ions did not nu l l i fy 
the a p p l i c a n t ' s convict ion for purposes of the federal s t a t u t e . 
The Court s ta ted: 
We recognized in L£j£is that a qual i fy ing 
pardon, see 27 CFR S 178.142 (1982), or a 
consent from the Secretary of the Treasury 
would operate to r e l i e v e the d i s a b i l i t y . 445 
U .S . , at 60 -61 . So far as the face of the 
s ta tu te i s concerned, however, expunction 
under s t a t e law does not a l t e r the h i s t o r i c a l 
fact of the conviction, and does not open the 
way to a license despite the conviction, as 
does p o s i t i v e or "affirmative a c t i o n , " jJaiiL., 
by way of the Secretary ' s consent on the 
condit ions spec i f i ed by § 925(c ) . 
i d . at 114-15 (emphasis added). This same a n a l y s i s app l i e s t o 
Utah's current expungement and peace o f f i cer c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
s t a t u t e s . 
Based upon the foregoing d i scuss ion , the d i s t r i c t court 
erred in concluding that § 77-18-2 prohibited P.O.S.T. from 
considering Ms. Doe's expunged convic t ions for c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
purposes. I t s statement that an expungement under § 77-18-2 
l e g a l l y n u l l i f i e s a prior convict ion simply i s not cons i s t ent with 
the s tatutory language. 
CONCLUSION 
In deciding the issue presented here, the Court must 
c l o s e l y examine the s p e c i f i c language used in §§ 67-15-10 .5(1) (d) 
and (e) and § 77 -18-2 . A f a i r reading of the p la in language of 
those s t a t u t e s , coupled with a recognit ion of the c lear purpose 
of the peace o f f i cer standards and tra in ing s t a t u t e s , ind ica te s 
that the Legis lature did not intend t o r e s t r i c t P.O.S.T's 
considerat ion of d i squa l i fy ing criminal conv ic t ions for purposes 
of peace o f f i cer c e r t i f i c a t i o n t o those convic t ions that have not 
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been expunged* Given t h e language employed, t h e L e g i s l a t u r e 
could not have in tended t o " o b l i t e r a t [ e ] the f a c t t h a t the 
defendant had been f i n a l l y adjudged g u i l t y of a c r i m e . " Meyerf 
34 Cal .2d a t 65 , 206 P.2d a t 1087. I t being wel l s e t t l e d t h a t 
when asked t o cons t rue a s t a t u t e , a cou r t must be c o n t r o l l e d by 
the evident purpose of the L e g i s l a t u r e t o a t t a i n a c e r t a i n end 
and must s t r i v e t o i n s u r e proper e f f ec t t o l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , 
Parson Asphalt Produc t ion , I n c . v. Utah S t a t e Tax Commission. 617 
P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980) ; S t a t e v. Navaro f 83 Utah 6 , 26 P.2d 
955, 959 (1933) , t h i s Court should r eve r se the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s 
order and r u l e t h a t P .O.S.T. and the P.O.S.T. Council may 
p roper ly cons ider c o n v i c t i o n s expunged under § 77-18-2 in 
dec id ing whether t o revoke, suspend, or deny c e r t i f i c a t i o n under 
§§ 67-15-10 .5 (1 ) (d ) and ( e ) . 
RESPECTFULLY submit ted t h i s /fc> " d a y of June , 1986. l i l(o da  
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (/ 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I mai led four t r u e and exac t 
cop ie s of t he foregoing Br ie f , postage p repa id , t o L. Zane G i l l , 
G i l l & Wade, At torney for Respondent, Val ley Tower Bu i ld ing , 
Suite 900, 50 West 300 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101, t h i s 
'day of June, 1986. 
SO <UMJL. ^L>- ^=^CryyUa^f^-^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANE DOE, 
vs. 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY, PEACE OFFICER 
STANDARDS AND TRAINING, TED E. 
LEAMONS, DIRECTOR; WILLIAM L. 
FLINK; AND JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 
IV, 
Respondents. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-7192 
Judge Dee 
This matter came before the Court on Friday, February 
7, 1986 for hearing on cross motions for summary judgment 
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court having heard oral * 
arguments of counsel, having considered the respective motions 
of the parties and all other documents in the Court's file, the 
Court having heretofore signed and filed its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, now, therefore, it is hereby: 
granted. 
denied. 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. That Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
2. That Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DATED thi 'jS day of djb/ , 1986, 
Approved as to Form: 
David B. Thompson 
Attorney for Respondents 
By the-JZourt: 
H. DiXON ninDLEY 
A O • CLERK \ 
o y > j , - »-v«- - — ^ i _ 
V D*rvity Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I sent a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER, postage prepaid, to David B. Thompson, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 7 day of 
RkMIllj 
L. lane Gill A3716 
GILL ft WADE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Valley Tower Building 
Suite 900 
50 Nest 300 South 
Sa l t Lake City , Utah 64101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7781 
FILED INCLt'MUIi Oi'r.Ci.,. 
Salt L*^c ' " v - * • i; y.-. 
APR 1
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Jane Doe, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
State of Utah Department 
of Public Safety, 
Peace Officer Standards and 
Training, 
Ted E. Leamons, Director; 
William L. Flink; and 
John Does I through IV., 
Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C85-7192 
Judge Dee 
Respondents filed their Motion for Summary Judgment and 
accompanying memorandum on about December 30, 1985. Respondents 
sought declaratory summary judgment on the question as set 
forth in their memorandum: Whether P.O.S.T. and the P.O.S.T. 
council may consider convictions expunged under Utah Code 
Annotated §77-18-2 in deciding whether to grant or deny 
certification under Utah Code Annotated §67-15-10.5. 
Petitioner also moved for declaratory summary judgment on 
the following issues as stated in her memorandum in support: 
_? i' 
Doe Findings of Pact 
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1* Whether P.O.S.T. may consider expungements in 
its deliberations regarding police officer 
certification. 
2. Whether public policy forbids any consideration 
by P.O.S.T. of records sealed by expungement 
under Utah Code Annotated §77-18-2, and 
3. Whether P.O.S.T. has a ministerial duty to issue 
police officer certification to petitioner if 
her expunged records cannot be considered. 
The parties stated no disagreement as to each other's 
statement of undisputed facts. 
The court heard oral argument by L. Zane Gill on behalf of 
petitioner and David B. Thompson on behalf of P.O.S.T., having 
considered the respective motions of the parties and all other 
documents in the court's file. After being fully advised in the 
premises, the court now makes it Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner Jane Doe is a resident of Salt Lake 
County and is an employee of Adult Probation and Parole of the 
Utah State Division of Corrections. 
2. The State of Utah Department of Public Safety, 
Peace Officers Standards and Training ("P.O.S.T.") is a 
governmental entity duly created under Utah Code Ann. §67-15-1 
.. ^ , ~-**mm AfKftruUA indicated, are to 
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Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended). Ted E. Leamons is the 
director of P.O.S.T. and William L. Flink is an employee of 
P.O.S.T. 
3. Petitioner obtained expungement and sealing of 
felony conviction records pursuant to 77-18-2 in 1984 prior to 
applying for P.O.S.T. certification, 
4. Petitioner is required to obtain peace officer 
certification in order to maintain her present employment. 
5. Petitioner made application for training through 
P.O.S.T. to attain certification. 
7. Petitioner replied to questions on her P.O.S.T. 
application regarding a criminal record that she had none. 
8. Petitioner completed all requirements for 
P.O.S.T. certification. 
9. P.O.S.T. officials learned that Petitioner had a 
prior felony conviction. 
10. On the basis of an informal attorney general's 
opinion No. 84-63 (Exhibit MBM hereto), authored by David B. 
Thompson# P.O.S.T. officials, and specifically William L. Flink, 
attempted to summon Petitioner before a panel to determine if 
there is probable cause based on the fact of an expunged felony 
conviction to deny Petitioner peace officer certification. 
11. Respondents made inquiries regarding the 
existence of Petitioner's expungements. 
Doe Findings of Fact 
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12. This Court granted Petitioner a Temporary 
Restraining Order causing Respondents to cease and desist from 
conducting any further investigation relating to the existence 
of Petitioner's expungements. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This court has jurisdiction under 78-33-1 to 
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or 
not further relief is or could be claimed. 
2. At all pertinent times it was, and still is, the 
duty of Respondents to perform certain nondiscretionary 
functions set forth in 67-15-1 et seq, including but not limited 
to the issuance of certificates to peace officers who complete 
the basic police officers9 standards and training by passing the 
appropriate examination. 
3. P.O.S.T. has the statutory responsibility to 
assure that persons seeking peace officer certification meet 
minimum standards. 67-15-1 (Supp. 1985). 
4. P.O.S.T. has the nondiscretionary function of 
certifying law enforcement officers unless cause exists to 
refuse certification. 
5. Respondents have no authority to compel 
Petitioner to petition for the unsealing of her expungements. 
6. Respondents have no right to deny Petitioner 
P.O.S.T. certification since expungements, the underlying acts, 
and records thereof cannot be considered as an element of cause 
•%^* +r\ 4ceno r^rt i f {cation. 
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7. Respondents have no legal right to refuse to 
certify Petitioner if she refuses to petition for unsealing of 
the expungements. 
8. Petitioner lawfully replied to questions on her 
application to P.O.S.T. regarding a criminal record (67-15-6(3)) 
that she had none. 
9. Petitioner is entitled under 77-18-2 to respond 
to such questions as required under 67-15-6(3) as if no 
convictions ever occurred. 
10. Expungement by statute constitutes a judicial 
pardon and effects a sealing of any related records such that: 
(a) Petitioner and others may for all purposes act as though any 
expunged conviction had never occurred; and (b) only Petitioner 
is authorized to petition for the disclosure of any related 
records. 77-18-2(3) and (4). 
11. The legal effect of an expungement is to render 
any related conviction, arrest or record thereof a legal 
nullity, i.e., as a matter of law the conviction, arrest or 
record never existed. 
12. Respondents may not consider, for purposes of 
determining cause for refusal to issue petitioner's P.O.S.T. 
certification, any expungement, since by law the related events 
and records never existed. 
13. Without considering Petitioner's expungements, 
rAcnnn^ pntfs hav» no cause to refuse certification. 
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14. Without cause to refuse Petitioner's 
certification! Respondents have a nondiscretionary duty to issue 
Petitioner's P.O.S.T. certification. 
15. 77-18-2 is based on the public policy of 
encouraging the rehabilitation of those who have violated the 
laws of the state. 
16. The Court rejects P.O.S.T.'s contention that 
the Utah expungement statute does not prevent P.O.S.T.'s 
consideration of the historical fact of a felony conviction. 
Such a position belies the obvious public policy of promoting 
rehabilitation of felons and the basic human virtue of 
forgiveness. 
17. The present expungement statute 77-18-2 is the 
result of a 1980 amendment of its predecessor. The former was 
modified in regard to any inquiry regarding the existence of a 
conviction. The latter substituted language specifically 
relating to inquiries by an employer. 
Employers may inquire concerning arrests or 
convictions only to the extent that the arrests have 
not been expunged or the record of convictions 
sealed under this provision. In the event an 
employer asks concerning arrests which have been 
expunged or convictions the records of which have 
been sealed, the person who has received expungement 
of arrest or judicial pardon may answer as though 
Doe Findings of Fact 
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19. The briefs of the parties describe the efforts 
of both this court, through Judge Sawaya, and the Federal 
District Court in Utah to find the intent of the Utah 
Legislature when it amended the expungement statute. The 
Amberson' case cited by Respondents is inapposite on its facts 
and on the law. Thompson v. Department of the Treasuryf 557 F. 
Supp 158, 167 (D Utah 1982), also cited by Respondent, is an 
effort by Judge Anderson to devine the intent of the Legislature 
in making the changes it did. This Court, of course, is not 
bound by the Federal Court decision. The Thompson ruling 
recognizes that there is an apparent change in the statute 
moving from broad, general language to more specific language 
regarding the effect of an expungement. However, no statement 
is made as to why this change was made. 
This Court has also searched for the legislative 
intent behind the change. There is no record of such intent as 
is pointed out in Thompson at 167. 
In argument Mr. Gill pointed out the fact that 
perhaps the greatest obstacle in the path of a rehabilitated 
felon is getting a job. The more specific language in the 
statute relates to inquiries by employers into the existence of 
'Amberson v. Leamons, Third District Court No. C85-6240 
(November 25, 1985) (ruling that P.O.S.T. could properly deny 
certification to a person whose felony arrest had been erased by 
a deferred sentencing statute in Colorado.) 
Doe Findings of Pact 
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past convictions• It is reasonable to discern from the more 
specific language an intent of the Legislature to embody 
recognition of this obstacle in the statute rather than to 
restrict the effect of an expungement. 
If P.O.S.T.#as a licensing agency, is allowed to 
deny access to peace officer employment to any former felon 
despite the fact that an independent judge in a full and fair 
hearing has decided that the public's forgiveness has been 
earned through rehabilitation, any licensing group could do the 
same. This could bar rehabilitated felons from entering any 
number of professional fields^ and would belie the public policy 
supporting the 1980 amendment to the expungement statute, i.e. 
promoting the hirability of a rehabilitated felon. 
DATED this / ^ day o f £ & & ^ 1986. 
^ £ 
ct Judge1 
HI. DiXON 1-IIIMDLEY 
/ W CLERK
 x 
By ^ W y . M , • ;;/ 
?Under this analysis a rehabilitated felon could be denied 
access to any profession requiring certification on licensure 
such as teaching, real estate, stock trading, medicine, law, 
even used car dealer. 
APPENDIX B 
In and for s.it M * " ^ " ™^^n"'ffiunty, Siaic of U I a | , 
T H E S T A T E O F U T A H 
iMiiinii/fQy (j I9g^)rdcr of Judicial Pardon and 
w >
 v Kxpun&cmcnt 0 f Record 
Ry V ^ V ^ L , J#xhk(M so. - 2660l) 
Defendant (pet i t ionc iV / 
The above entitled case having come before the court upon due notice gocn on the — j % I N t 
_ _ . 19 • _ _ . upon defendant's petition lot judicial pardon and for the expungement of h 
record of conviction in this court, made pursuant to the p io \ i \ io iu oi Scciion 77 IK-2 . DC A ln'».l . lN amended, th 
petitioner appearing in person and by nis attorney — S t C t i i C n . ) R . . . M c C l L i a h c y . and the pl.uiiiitf appcarmj 
.hrough Richard Shep-ird
 0 c p u t > (. | l | | n |> A l | o m c > ,,, _Salt Lake ^ ^ 
And it appearing from the records of the eouti tn the aho\e emnlei! case that the petitioner C Q ^ I E K, _M^.: 
u -i re i. 5-6-46 , , ,, , Snlt Lake County Sher i f f 
whose date of birth is and u ho uasancsicil h\ the umlci I tie Numbc; 
54199 , 24th , , J.-iffiiary 74 
^ on ihc da\ o! 1 j i; 
was convicted in this court of the crime of P ° s » °Aj^IlLA\?jJ2L Xf l \HP 3 r d ^ 
October ,9 _74_.
 w h i c h w J d Cf imc l s , ^\s^A_rjis^anor Ufu|cf ^ L|U% o f |hc S | j | c 
of Utah; 
And the court, having received testimony at said heating ami othct icqucstcd inlorm.ition. ami basing tully 
considered the petition, now cnun its findings as follows 
I. That a period of at least five years has passed since said petitioner uas released from . J ? I p f o a t i o n l i .^r f . . r, l « 
2. Thai said petitioner has not been com icted of a felony of ol a misdemeanor uuoKmg moral uopimdc and that 
no proceeding involving such a crime is pending or being instituted against the petitioner. 
3. That the rehabilitation of the petitioner has been attained to the saiisl.uiion of the court 
N O W T H E R E F O R E . IT IS H E R I ' l i Y O R m ' R r i ) AS I O l I ( ) \VS 
I That all records in the petitioner's above entitled case in the custody of this court, or in the custod) ol an\ other 
court agency or official be sealed: 
I I . Thai copies of this order shall he sent to the Utah Rurcauof Identification, ihc — 5 5 l * L I * ? . v 5 _ 
Salt Lake City Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office, the Police Dcpaitmcni.ihc 
County Sheriffs Office, and the Utah Stale Prison; 
I I I . The aforementioned arresting agency shall request the return to that agency of the petitioner's fingerprint 
record with regard to the above matter from the Identification Division of the I cdcral Bureau of Investigation; 
IV. That upon entry of this order, the petitioner shall be deemed judicial!) paidoncd and he may hereafter respond 
to any inquiries relating to convictions of crimes as though the conviction above described had nvwr occurred. 
V. That inspection of the records in this courl.and records held in the courts and agencies or by the officials named 
above, shall thereafter be permitted by the court only upon the petition of the said Cnnnin v < . Mnrtv>nqpn 
||'riilM.r«<| l l n t i M 
and shall only be inspected by the persons named in such petition lor inspection 
Dated this | j ) A - H day of J S L t t V 19 .% 
A T Y E r i f 
i n mc __iLLL^ HLEQ iti rLCQK-o o>M^gial District Court 
In and ft" SALT IAKK C:'t ? .r.r - (Vu.nty, State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH •'•"iV t» 1QA/I < 
I'laimWr' i '"COrdcr of Judicial Pardon and 
•Y^*^ l e' 7*"' \ : , , : l Expungement of Record 
By-±Jt±r*r,A ^ - ^ J y 24332 
C r fast* No. Defendant (pctmoV 
The above entitled case havmf come before the court upon due nonce given on the . _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ da\ of 
. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ « . _ _ . 19 . upon defendant** petition lor judicial pardon and for the expungement of his 
record of conviction in this court, made pursuant to the provisions ol Section 77- IK-2. DC'A IV5.^  as amended, the 
petitioner appearing in person and by hi\ attorney -STPPlIHNJR^J'icCAUQ 1EY . and the plainntf appearing 
thi jugh _RTniARn faiFPAPD Deputy County Attorney of ,£alt_I / lkr> County. 
And it appearing from the record* of the court in the above entitled case that the petitioner CONNIE M. MORTEN-PI 
whose date of birth is Mr*y 6* 1?4 6 .and » ho was arrested bv the S a l t l a k e C i t v P o l i c e
 u n j c r | ,}c Number 
on the 
-
2?&aiT^rj™noy *•> "' ^ ^ ^ - ^ , v 7 - ~ 
was convicted in this court of the crime of —under—£a]fcd-pret£nc^£ »n the — _ day of 
Scpterrjjcr
 | 9 72 . u hich %ajd c f imc i% a Felony u | |Jc f lhc Jaus of lhc S u | c 
ol Utah. 
And the court, having received testimony at said heating and other requested information, and having fully 
considered the petition, now enters its findings as follows: 
I. That a period of at least five years has passed since said petitioner was iclcascd from * JTOOatlOn 
2 1 hat said petitioner has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that 
no ptocecding involving such a crime is pending or being instituted against the petitioner. 
J That the rehabilitation ol the petitioner has been attained to the satislaction of the court. 
NOW THEREFORE. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS l-'OI.I.OWS: 
I That all rctords in the petitioner's above entitled case in the custody of this court, or in the custody of any other 
court agency or official be scaled; 
II. Ihal copies of this order shall be sent to the Utah Bureau of Identification, the S a l t Lake 
County Attorney's Office, .h- S a l t Lake C i t y ,»o |; tc i y p : i r t m c n l l h e S a l t Lake 
County Sheriffs Office, and the Utah State Prison; 
UI. The aforementioned arresting agency shall request lhc return to that agency of the petitioner's fingerprint 
record with regard to the above matter from the Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
IV. That upon entry of this order, the petitioner shall be deemed judicially pardoned and he may hereafter respond 
lo any inquiries relating to convictions of crimes as though the conviction above described had never occurred; 
V. That inspection of the records in this court, and records held in the courts and agencies or by the officials named 
ibove. shall thereafter be permitted by the court only upon the petition of the said CCNNIE M. MPRTENSEfl 
tnd \hall onl> be inspected by the persons named in such petition for inspection. 
Dated this k ^ day of hAJJJ^ 19 £ ± ^ . 
/ & : . . : . " > ' * > 
APPENDIX C 
77-18-1 Expungement and sealing of records. (1) (a) Any person who 
has been convicted of any crime within this state may petition the convict-
ing court for a judicial pardon and for sealing of his record in that court. 
At the time the petition is filed and served upon the prosecuting attorney, 
the court shall set a date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting attorney 
for the jurisdiction of the date set for hearing. Any person who may have 
relevant information about the petitioner may testify at the hearing and 
the court, in its discretion, may request a written evaluation of the adult 
parole and probation section of the state division of corrections. 
(b) If the court finds the petitioner for a period of five years in the case 
of a class A misdemeanor or felony, or for a period of three years in the 
case of other misdemeanors or infractions, after his release from incarcer-
ation, parole or probation whichever occurs last, has not been convicted 
of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that no 
proceeding involving such a crime is pending or being instituted against 
the petitioner and further finds that the rehabilitation of petitioner has 
been attained to the satisfaction of the court, it shall enter an order that 
all records in petitioner's case in the custody of that court or in the custody 
of any other court, agency or official be sealed. The provisions of this sub-
section shall not apply to violations for the operation of motor vehicle 
under title 41. The court shall also issue to the petitioner a certificate stat-
ing the court's finding that he has satisfied the court of his rehabilitation. 
(2) (a) In any case in which a person has been arrested with or without 
a warrant, that individual after 12 months, provided there have been no 
intervening arrests, may petition the court in which the proceeding 
occurred, or, if there were no court proceedings, any court in the jurisdic-
tion where the arrest occurred, for an order expunging any and all records 
of arrest and detention which may have been made, if any of the following 
occurred: 
(i) He was released without the filing of formal charges; 
(ii) Proceedings against him were dismissed, he was discharged without 
a conviction and no charges were re filed against him within 30 days there-
after, or he was acquitted at trial; or 
(iii) The record of any proceedings against him has been sealed pursu-
ant to subsection (1). 
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is eligible for relief under this 
subsection, it shall issue its order granting the relief prayed for and fur-
ther directing the law enforcement agency making the initial arrest to 
retrieve any record of that arrest which may have been forwarded to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identifi-
cation. 
(c) This subsection shall apply to all arrests and any proceedings which 
occurred before, as well as those which may occur after, the effective date 
of this act 
(3) Employers may inquire concerning arrests or convictions only to the 
extent that the arrests have not been expunged or the record of convictions 
sealed under this provision. In the event an employer asks concerning 
arrests which have been expunged or convictions the records of which have 
been sealed, the person who has received expungement of arrest or judicial 
pardon may answer as though the arrest or conviction had not occurred. 
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be permitted by the court only 
upon petition by the person who is the subject of those records and only 
to the persons named in the petition. 
APPENDIX D 
7748-17.5. Expunfement of court rtoords —(1) (a) Any person who 
has been convicted of any crime within this state may petition the con-
victing court for a judicial pardon and for the expungement of his record 
in that court. At the time the petition is filed, the court shall set a date 
for a bearing and notify the prosecuting attorney for the jurisdiction of 
the pendency of the petition and of the date act for the hearing. Any 
person who may have relevant information about the petitioner may testify 
at the hearing and the court, in its discretion, may request a written evalua-
tion of the adult parole and probation section of the Utah division of cor-
rections. 
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner, for a period of five years in 
the case of a class A misdemeanor or felony, or for a period of one year in 
the case of other misdemeanors, since his release from incarceration or pro-
bation, has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving 
moral turpitude and that no proceeding involving such a crime is pending or 
being instituted against the petitioner and, further, finds that the rehabili-
tation of the petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, it 
shall enter an order that all records in the petitioner's case in the custody 
of that court or in the custody of any other court, agency or official, be 
sealed. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to violations for 
the operation of motor vehicles under Title 41, of the Utah Code. 
(c) Upon the entry of the order in those proceedings, the petitioner 
shall be deemed judicially pardoned and the petitioner may thereafter re-
spond to any inquiries relating to convictions of crimes as though that 
conviction never occurred. 
(2) (a) In any case in which a person has been arrested with or 
without a warrant, that individual after twelve months, provided there 
have been no intervening arrests, may petition the court in which the 
proceeding occurred, or, if there were no court proceedings, any court in 
the jurisdiction where the arrest occurred, for an order expunging any 
and all records of arrest and detention which may have been made, if any 
of the following occurred: 
(i) He was released without the filing of formal charges; 
(ii) Proceedings against him were dismissed, he was discharged with-
out a conviction and no charges mere rcfiled against him within thirty 
days thereafter, or he was acquitted at trial; or 
(iii) The record of any proceedings against him has been expunged 
pursuant to subsection (1). 
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is eligible for relief under 
this subsection, it shall issue its order granting the relief prayed for and 
further directing the law enforcement agency making the initial arrest to 
retrieve any record of that arrest which may have been forwarded to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thereafter, the arrest, detention, and any 
further proceedings in the ease shall be deemed not to have occurred, and a 
petitioner may answer accordingly any question relating to their existence. 
(c) This subsection shall apply to all arrests and any proceedings which 
occurred before, as well as those which may occur after, the effective date 
of this act 
(3) Copies of any order issued pursuant hereto shall be aent to each 
court, agency or official named in the order. 
(4) Inspection of the records shall thereafter be permitted by the 
court only upon petition by the person who is the subject of those records 
and only to the persons named in that petition. 
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ATTORNEY GENEIAtf 
The matter of Plaintiff's Petition for Issuance of an Extraordlanary 
It came on regularly for hearing on the 18th day of November, 1985 with 
pearances as above Indicated. The matter was fully presented, argued 
d submitted and the decision thereon taken under advisement by the Court. 
e Court having n ov fully considered the matter makes Its ruling and 
clslon thereon as follows: 
The Court Is of the opinion that under the uncontroverted facts and the 
rcumstances of thismatter the P.O.S.T. Council denial of certification 
s justified under the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 67-15-10.5(1)(d). Une 
fear intent and purpose of the legisfcature to deny cerfification under 
zts as these seems apparent to the Court. The principal issue being the 
ral character of the applicant* The statutory proccedure for subsequent 
smlssal of charges following entry of a guilty plea, under Colorado law, 
aid not work contrary to the obvious intent of the legislature. 
3A3ed upon the foregoing and upon the grounds and reasons stated in 
e defendants memorandum the Petition of the Plcytfitiff is denied. 
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